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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WAYNE STERLING PEARSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
12749

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Wayne Sterling Pearson, appeals
from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LO\\TER COURT
On June 18, 1971, a hearing was set and heard on a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Honorable .Marcellus K. Snow in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that Wayne
Sterling Pearson's commitment to the Utah State

2

Prison was invalid. After hearing the matter, Judge
Snow denied the petition.
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an af firmance of the denial
of the writ made by Judge Snow.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 16, 1970, appellant was tried and convicted by a jury of the crimes of grand larceny and
burglary in the second degree. The transcript of the
trial was admitted into evidence in the habeas corpus
hearing, necessitating reference in this brief to the trial
transcript as "T" and the habeas corpus transcript as
"I-I".
At the habeas corpus hearing, appellant testified
that immediately following his cmwiction his attorney,
'Valter Ellett, told him that he would file a notice of
appeal (I-I. 4). l\Ir. Ellett did not file the appeal, so
appellant filed it himself and received confirmation
(II. 5). Appellant testified that subsequently l\Ir. Ellett again met with him and informed him that "he felt
that" three or four more charges" would probably "be
filed against the petitioner, and if petitioner would dismiss his appeal all new charges would he dropped (H.
6, 7). l\lr. Ellett also informed appellant that at a
later time he could try to obtain release on a writ of
habeas corpus (H. 7). Appellant testified that he felt
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that if he were charged with the other offenses he would
he convicted (H. 8, 9). He, therefore, dismissed his
appeal (II. 8). The other charges were in fact dismissed
(II. 8, 9-A).
The trial transcript revealed the following pertinent facts:
On the evening of April 18, 1970, between 8 :00
and 8 :30 p.m. a red Avis panel truck was observed stopping in front of the Richard R. Jensen residence located at 5202 East Moor Road, Salt Lake City, Utah
( T. 21). Approximately 20 minutes later, a red Avis
panel truck was observed on the lawn of the Jensen
residence with the back of the truck near the doorway
( T. 22). Two men were seen loading a large object
into the back of the truck ( T. 22). \Vhen observer's
automobile lights were shown on the area, the truck
hastily drove away with the two men running behind it
(T. 22, 22). No license number was obtained (T. 24).
At approximately 10 :00 p.m., the Jensen's returned home, found their front door open, and discovered their gold sofa, money, and a coin collection missing (T. 7, 10, 12). l\fr. Jensen later identified his sofa
that had been found in a home rented to a Mr. and Mrs.
Bogue (later identified as appellant and his co-defendant ( T. 6, 48).
Clyde Thomas Beard, an employee of the Great
Salt Lake Transportation Company, testified that on
April 18, 1970, before 5 :30 p.m. he rented a red Avis
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panel truck to Loretta K. Bogue (T. 27), and that
business records indicated the truck was returned at
10:49 p.m. on the same date (T. 29, 30, 33). Appellant
was i<lentificd as having dropped l\Irs. Bogue off at
the A vis rentals ( T. 74). He hiter picked her up when
the truck was returned ( T. 62, 84). l\Ir. Beard testified that there were no other A Yis licensees in the Salt
Lake area ( T. Bl).
l\Irs. Joan S. Huston testified that she rented, unfurnished, the home at 1248 North 1400 West to l\Ir.
and l\Irs. 'Vayne Bogue on February 28, 1970, and
identified those persons as appellant and Loretta llogue
( T. 39, 40). She recalled that appellant paid the first
month's rent in cash (T. 40), that the home was occupied until the middle of June ( T. 43) , and that other
payments were made by postal money orders and she
di<l not know who paid them (T. 43). She also testified that she visited the home approximately eight times
and observed appellant at the home twice, and on the
second occasion appellant was there alone and informed
her that ''his wife" was not at home (T. 41, 44). Mrs.
II uston endeavored to collect the rent at that time, and
appellant replied that he could not pay it then, that he
would have his wife send the money order the following day (T. 43).
Denese l\Ierrell testified that she lived next door
to l\J rs. Bogue and appellant and had been a babysitter for them about ten times ( T. 34). She observed
that appellant was present five or six of these occasions
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dressed in coat and tie ( T. 37), and noted that the
children ref erred to him as their father ( T. 36). Miss
l\Ierrell said she was paid by appellant on four of those
occasions (T. 37). She noticed appellant coming and
going from the house and occasionally saw his car
parked there (T. 36). She also testified that on the
21st or 22nd of April she observed more furniture in
the house including a gold couch ( T. 35) .
Detective Neil C. Boswell testified that after obtaining information from the J ensens, their neighbors,
officials of Avis rental, and Denese Merrell (T. 46, 47)
he obtained a search warrant, and proceeded to the
Bogue residence ( T. 47). Detective Boswell found
l\Irs. Bogue home with her children, observed a sofa
matching the description in the warrant ( T. 47), arrested her, and arranged for the evidence to be transported to the police department (T. 47). Mrs. Bogue
was permitted to make telephone calls at her neighbor's
home ( T. 55), and .Mrs. Bogue testified that one of
those calls was to the residence of .Mr. Gary 'Vinger,
where she left the following message for appellant:
"Tell him they are coming to arrest me and I am going" ( T. 67) . Appellant arrived at the Bogue home
shortly thereafter, and Detective Boswell informed him
that he did not have a warrant for his arrest, but would
seek one (T. 51) to which appellant replied "You have
got nothing on me. This is not my house" (T. 51). Appellant was arrested the following day ( T. 52).
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POINT I

TUE ISSUES \VIIICH PETITIONER
RAISES AS TO SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ARE NOT JUSTICIARLE IN A
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING .
.Appellant alleges he was denied due process of law
because there was insufficient e\'idence to justify submitting his case to the jury, and insufficient evidence
to support a verdict of guilty. These issues were known
to the petitioner at the time of his commitment to the
Utah State Prison, yet he discontinued taking his appeal on these issues ( H. 8). According to Utah law,
the proper procedure should have been to appeal his
sentence.
Appellant is trying to use the writ of habeas corpus
as a means of appellate review. This is not the purpose
for which the writ was established. See Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121 ( 19G7), wherein it
states:
"The writ is, as our rules describe it, an
e,rfraordinary 'lL'rit, to be used to protect one
who is restrained of his liberty where there
exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where
the requirements of the law have been so
ignored or distorted that the part.11 is substantially and cffectively denied what is included
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in the term due proceNs of law, or where some
other such circumstance exists that it would be
wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the
conviction." (emphasis added). Id. at 286-287,
122-123.
When the same facts alleged in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus were known to the petitioner at
the time of his judgment, his proper remedy is not a
writ. In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968
( 1D68), the petitioner contended that he was denied a
right to counsel, and that he did not understand the consequences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court of
Utah held that petitioner was not entitled to the habeas
corpus remedy:
"If the contention of error is something
which is known or should be known to the party
at the time the judgment was entered, it must
be reviewed in the manner and within the time
permitted by regular proscribed procedure,
or the judgment becomes final and is not subject to further attack, except in some such
unusual circumstances as we have mentioned
above. \¥ere it otherwise, the regular rules of
procedure governing appeals and limitations
of time specified therein would be rendered
impotent." (emphasis added) Id. at 98-99,
969.
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In Sullivan

Turner,
Utah 2d 85, 448, P. 2d
907 (1968), the Utah Court held:
'l'.

"\Vhen an accused is convicted of a crime,
our law requires that any claimed error or defect he corrected by a regular appeal within
the time allowed by law, and if this is not done
the judgment becomes final. It can then he
subjected to collateral attack by an extraordinary writ only when the interests of justice
so demand because of some
circumstance or exigency: e.g., lack of jurisdiction, mistaken identify, where the rcquire111e!1ts of la·w have been so ignored or distorted
That the accused has been deprived of 'due
process of law' .... " (emphasis added) Id. at
87, 908.
The facts of the present case do not reveal any
" unusua l" or " ex t raorc1mary
·
.
t ances " m
. w l uc
. Il
circums
legal principles were ''ignored or distorted." The writ
of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary writ, demands
a showing of such before it can he granted. Insuf ficiency of evidence, is a commonly invoked argument used
by clefendants at the trial and appellate levels of the
judicial structure, and is rarely extreme enough to serve
as a ground in a habeas corpus proceeding.
This view was recently expressed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
nlathis v. Colorado, 425 F. 2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1070)
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wherein it was held that evidence is subject to review
on habeas corpus only if the record is totally devoid of
such:
"The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a connection is not subject to federal
habeas review ... Unless the conviction is so
totally devoid of evidentiary support as to
raise a due process issue," Edmondson v. Warden, 35 I•..... 2d 608, 609 (4th Cir. 1965) ."Id. at
1166.
The trial record in the present case contains ample
evidence to connect petitioner with the crime and is far
from being "totally devoid" of evidence.
Those state courts which have ruled on this issue
uphold the stricter concept that evaluation of the evidence is not an issue to be asserted on habeas corpus.
Oklahoma, for example, adheres to the following view:
"On the question of the sufficiency of the
evidence, this was a question that can only be
reached by appeal, and habeas corpus is not a
substitute for appeal." Application of Lewis,
339 P. 2d 799, 800 (Okla. Crim. 1959).
Also see In re Les.<tard, 62 Cal. 2d 497, 399 P. 2d 39,
42 Cal. Rptr. 583 ( 1965).
It should finally be noted that in every Utah case
cited by appellant to show habeas corpus being used to
review corrections, not one petition for the writ was
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granted. These cases represented such grounds as
coerced confession, right to counsel, failure to call witnesses and u nla wf ul arrest, yet this Court did not find
the circumstances of these cases "extraordinary"
enough to grant the writ.
From the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude
that sufficiency of evidence is not an initiable issue in
a habeas corpus proceedng, and since appellant failed
to pursue his appeal, he should not be allowed to use a
habeas corpus hearing as a substitute for appeal.

POINT II
IF· THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
ISSUE IS JUSTICIABLE, THE EVIDENCE
'VAS SUF}'ICIENT TO .JUSTIFY SUBMITTED THE CASE TO THE JURY, AND TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF
GUILTY.
The rules governing the scope of review as to
sufficiency of the evicleuce in a criminal case to sustain
the verdiet are well settled: It is for the jury to judge
the credibility of witnesses and determine the facts;
evidence will be reviewed iu the light most favorable to
the verdict; and if when so viewed it appears the jury
acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not
be disturbed. State r. TYar<l, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P. 2d
865 ( 1959).
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Reasonable doubt is described as follows:
" 'Reasonable doubt' is not a mere imaginary,
captious, or a possible doubt, but a fair doubt,
based upon reason and common sense, and
growing out of the testimony of the case. It
is such a doubt as will leave the juror's mind,
after a careful examination of all the evidence,
in such condition that he cannot say that he has
an abiding conviction, to a moral certain, of
the defendant's guilt." State v. Taylor, 21
Utah 2d 425, 429, 446 P. 2d 954, 956 ( 1968).

State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212
( 1957), cert. denied, 35.5 U.S. 848, 2 L. Ed. 2d 57, 78
S. Ct. 7 4 ( 1957), further adds:
". . . proof beyond all peradventure of
doubt could seldom be had. Nor does the law
require it." Id. at 114, 215.
Due to the desirability of safeguarding the integrity of the jury system, the courts are reluctant to interfere with jury verdicts, and they refuse to do so
when there is "any reasonable basis in evidence" to
justify the decision. See Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah
2d 364, 368, 412 P. 2d 451, 4.33 (1966). "Reasonable
basis in evidence" or "substantial evidence" has been
described as evidence from which, together with fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom, reasonable
minds could conclude as the jury did. See Gordon v.
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Pro1·0 Cif.lJ, 15 Utah 2d 287, 290, 391 P. 2d 430, 433
( H)()4).

The evidence in the trial record, viewed under the
above standards, is more than adequate to justify the
jury's verdict of guilty. The record disclosed that the
petitioner dropped Lorretta Bogue off at Avis Rentals
to rent a panel truck ( T. 7 4), and picked her up when
the truck was returned ( T. 62, 84). The same truck
was observed on the front lawn of the home that was
burglarized, and two men were seen loading a "large
object" into the hack of the truck (T. 22). The burglarized items were subscquentl.'I found in a home rented in
the name of petitioner. (T. 6, 48). 'iVitnesses testified
that petitioner was often seen at the home where the
incriminating evidence was found and that the children
in the home referred to him as "father" (T. 36).
Hespondent submits that the above facts provide
basis in evidence" to support the jury's
a
decision.
Petitioner was convicted of burglary in the second
degree and grand larceny under Utah Code Ann. §§
76-9-3, 76-38- 1' 76-38-4 ( 1953).

The only elements the state need establish for the
crime of larceny are recently stolen property in the
possession of the defendant, and an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession. See State v. Allred, 16 Utah
2d 41, 43-44, 395 p. 2d 535, 537 ( 1964) .
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In State ·u. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 151, 449 P. 2d
993, 995 ( 1969), the Utah Supreme Court stresses that
under the possession of stolen property provision (Utah
Cocle Ann. § 76-38-1., supra) the state need not present
direct proof identifying the defendant as the thief or
directly connecting him with the felonious taking or
asporation since the legislature has deemed possession
of recently stolen property without a satisfactory explanation as being sufficient to support the conviction.
The elements of possession without satisfactory
explanation may also be used to prove the commission
of the crime of burglary. In State v. Thomas, 121 Utah
639, 641, 244 P. 2d 653, 654 (1952), the court held that
possession of articles recently stolen, when coupled with
circumstances inconsistent with innocence, such as hiding or concealing them, or making a false, improbable,
or unsatisfactory explanation of the possession, may be
suffic;ent to connect the possessor with the offense of
burglary and justify his conviction of it.
It is apparent that all the essential elements of the
crimes of grand larceny and burglary are present in
this case. The evidence discloses sufficient circumstances to show that personal property was taken from
the Jensen home on the night of April 18, 1970 ('.f. 21,
22, 23) . The property was later found in a house rented
by petitioner ( T. 6, 48). The only explanation made
by the defendant concerning his possession was the following: "You have got nothing on me. This is not my
house." (T. 51). Possession, according to the court in

State 'l'. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 533, 261 P. 804, 805
( l 948), must he personal, conscious, and exclusive. Respondent contends· that petitioner was in the presence
of the stolen goods, that he was conscious of their presence, he exerc;sed dominion over'them, an<l that he failed
to make a satisfactory explanation of his possession.
Utah law on larceny demands a satisfactory explanation of possession. 'Ve, therefore, subm't that defendant refused or failed to meet the requirements of the
law to establish a satisfactory explanation of his possession.
l<'inally, petitioner has contended that the evidence
was insufficient to justify submitting the case to the
jury. 'Ve submit that the rules expressed in State v.
Thatcher, 108 Utah f>a, rn7 P. 2d 258 (1945), are controlling on this issue. 1 1hatcher, supra, held that when
different reasonable inferences can be drawn from the
evidence, the question is one exclusively within the province of the jury; that it is not the function of the court
to substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that
of the jury. .Justice 'V olfe, in his concurring opinion in
Thatcher, supra, stated the following:
"The rule which must be applied upon a
motion to dismiss a criminal case is that all
reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor
of the state, and only if the record itself reveals that no reasonable man could draw an inference of guilt therefrom is the trial court
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justified in taking the case from the Jury.
Id. at 74, 263.
The record clearly displays suf ficent evidence,
which raises reasonable inferences to justify submitting
the case to the jury.
For the above reasons, we submit that the evidence
was sufficient to justify submitting the case to the
jury, and to support the jury's verdict of guilty.

POINT III
APPELLANT W IT HD REW HIS APPEAL VOLUNTARILY AND WITH FULL
KNO,VLEDGE OF THE CONSEQUENCES.
The case of Hines v. Baker, 422
2d 1002 (10th
Cir. 1970), is factually analogous to the present case.
The petitioner argued that he had made no intelligent
and knowing waiver of his right to appeal. He had been
convicted of first degree murder, and had received a
sentence of life imprisonment. He and his attorney
agreed that no appeal should be taken due to the concern they had over a possible death ·sentence if a reversal
and new trial were obtained. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that if a petitioner decides to forego
his appeal after discussion with competent counsel to
escape the possibility of other punishment there is no
"constitutional infringement" in denying the writ of
habeas corpus on those grounds.
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In the present case, petitioner and his attorney
discussed whether an appeal should be taken. Afte.r
considering the possibility of having other charges
against him dropped, the petibmer knowingly and voluntarily decided not to pursue his appeal.
In Utah there is a presumption that pleas of guilty
and wai,·ers counsel are voluntarily and knowingly
made, and a defendant who attacks this presumption
must overcome it hy showing clearly that he was prejudiced by a denial of his constitutional rights. See 1llazme
v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d rn.>, ms, 468 P. 2d 369, 371
( 1970). '"' e contend that this presumption applies to
one who foregoes appealing his conviction, and that
petitioner has failed to m·ercome this presumption.
Appellant further alleges that the offer to drop
other charges pending against him if he dismissed his
appeal amounts to coercion. This argument is totally
without support. The courts in this country recognize
"bargaining" as an acceptable procedure. It is common
practice, for example, for prosecuting attorneys to
agree to dismiss or not file additional charges against a
defendant in return for a plea of guilty to certain
charges. See Smith v. People, 162 Colo. 558, 565, 428
P. 2d 69, 73 ( 1967). The Supreme Court of Utah recently discussed the coercion issue in two cases that involved "bargaining":
" . . . the mere fact that a defendant,
against whom there are multiple charges pend-
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ing, pleads guilty to one of them on the condition that the others be dropped certainly
does not in and of itself compel a finding of
coercion." Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294,
296, 452 P. 2d 323, 324 (1969).
"To us the evidence of the proceedings at
the time of plea is clear that [defendant] was
adequately represented by counsel and that he
knowingly, unclerstand;ngly, and voluntarily
entered the plea of guilty. True it is that one
of his motives was to free his wife from the
felony charge, but a bargain to that effect
with the district attorney does not necessarily
amount to coercion." Combs v. Turner, 25
Utah 2d 397, 399, 483 P. 2d 437, 438 ( 1971).
The record shows that no other charges have been
filed against appellant. Therefore, appellant was in no
way prejudiced in not taking his appeal. We, therefore,
respectfully submit that there is nothing in the record
to justify a conclusion that the will of the plaintiff
was overcome, or that he did not rationally weigh the
choices before him and choose the one which he thought
was most beneficial to his interest.
CONCLUSION
The State submits that sufficiency of evidence is
not a justiciable issue in a habeas corpus proceeding;
that if it were justiciable, the evidence was sufficient
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to submit the case to the jury and to support the jury's
verdict of guilty; and that appellant knowingly and
voluntarily withdrew his appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General

WILLIM1 T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

